often the media chooses to distort the reality of crime across a range of communi ties in die face of empirical evidence which supports die alternative view ' (1995:325) . It is also argued diat even if crime rates do cause alarm and distress in the community, harsher sentences will not reduce die incidence of crime since the 'real causes' of criminal behaviour are to be found in die socioeconomic back grounds of offenders, most notably 'alienation*, material and psychological depriva tion, and unemployment. Indeed, some commentators have even argued that many offenders, especially younger criminals, are diemselves 'victims' of society and ac cordingly deserve compassion and not punishment.
Yet despite its widespread acceptance among criminologists, die conventional wisdom diat, in general, punishment does not deter die crime can be questioned on bodi logical and empirical grounds.
The Economic Theory of Crime
Two generic approaches to crime and punishment can be found within the social sciences. On the one hand, criminologists, psychologists and odiers have argued diat (in the words of two of dieir critics) 'criminals are not rational and are driven to commit crimes by influences outside dieir control' (Buchanan & Hartley, 1992:48) . Economists, on die odier hand, have applied dieir standard model of homo economicus to die problem of crime and characterised criminal choice as a rational and calculated process. This approach follows Gary Becker's (1968:170) observa tion diat a useful dieory of crime does not require anything beyond die conven tional economic analysis of rational behaviour.
The key difference between die two approaches to crime resides in die fact diat whereas noil-economic dieories all provide deterministic explanations for criminal behaviour, die economic approach emphasises die role of individual choice. Aldiougli economists readily concede diat an individual's environment can influence bodi his preferences and die options available to him, diey nevertheless insist that people always have die freedom to choose between alternative courses of action. Economists do not deny dial poor education, limited work opportunities, and nu merous odier environmental, psychological and biological factors may influence criminal activity. They simply argue diat so long as diere is an element of rational choice involved in criminal behaviour, actual or potential criminals will respond to changes in dieir choice environment, including changes in die probability of appre hension and the severity of punishment.
The origins of die modern economic analysis of crime may be traced back at least as far as the seminal work of Beccaria (1794 Beccaria ( /1971 and Bendiam (1831 Bendiam ( /1838 . Despite being restated in increasingly sophisticated madiematical terms, die essen tials of diis approach to crime and punishment have changed litde in die intervening years. The economic dieory of crime centres on die putative decision by rational individuals on die marginal allocation of dieir scarce time between illegal and odier activities. Individuals will participate in criminal activity if die expected net benefit accruing from crime exceeds die expected net benefit derived from alternative le gitimate activities. Rational individuals are dius modelled as weighing up die antici-the anticipated benefits and costs associated widi some given form of crime and comparing the outcome against die outcomes of equivalent legal endeavours. The individual is dius seen as deciding how to allocate his or her scarce time, labour and odier resources amongst competing activities, some of' which may be criminal. Ra tional behaviour consists in selecting dial course of acdon believed most likely to generate die highest return to die individual. Aldiough outcomes are convendonally ranked in terms of wealdi maximisadon, diis need not be die case: physical, psychic and odier conceivable benefits may also be included.
The risk of detecdon, apprehension, convicdon and punishment is simply one of die many possible kinds of costs diat must be taken into consideradon. The economic dieory of crime is dius merely a special case of more general economic dieory of resource allocadon under constraints. In his classic contribudon to die economics of crime, Becker (1968:176) observed diat 'criminal behaviour becomes part of a much more general dieory and does not require ad hoc concepts of differendal association, anomie and die like, nor does it assume perfect knowledge, liglitening-fast calculation, or any of die odier caricatures of economic dieory'.
The economic approach of crime dius provides a coherent analytical frame work for explaining die level of criminal activity. The number of illegal offences committed in any given period depends on (among odier diings) die probability of conviction and die magnitude of punishment relative to die expected benefits flow ing from a criminal act. Accordingly, potential criminals can be deterred from ille gal activity by increases in die probability of detection, apprehension, conviction and punishment and also by increases in die severity of punishment attendant upon conviction. The probability of conviction and punishment and die severity of pun ishment are dius simply two sides of die same expected costs-ol-crime coin. A smaller probability of punishment can dierefore be compensated for by increasing die severity of punishment to deter criminals and vice versa. As Becker (1968:178) has argued, 'die widespread generalisation diat offenders are more deterred by die probability of conviction dian by die punishment when convicted turns out to imply in die expected utility approach diat offenders are risk preferrers, at least in die relevant region of punishments'.
The prediction that potential criminals can be deterred from committing of fences by (among odier diings) increases in die severity of punishment has signifi cant implications for die formation and implementation of criminal justice policies and for die wider debate on law and order in Australia. If die severity of punish ment and die rate of apprehension of offenders are two factors diat can reduce die incidence of crime by deterring potential criminals, diis c an significantiy assist policy formulation. For example, it follows diat we do not necessarily have to increase die rate of apprehension of criminals, which almost certainly involves a considerable and expensive increase in die number of police, in order to reduce die incidence of criminal behaviour. Increasing die severity of punishment while maintaining die current level of apprehension will also serve to reduce die incidence of crime. Aldiough increasing die severity of punishment by means of, say, longer prison sen-tences is not a costless alternative to higher apprehension rates, it may well prove a cheaper means of achieving the intended reduction in crime rates.
Although deterrence is an important objective of legally inflicted punishment, it is by no means die only one. Odier objectives, including incapacitation, rehabilita tion, reparation and retribution, and die reinforcing of informal penalties and shared moral values, are also sought by criminal justice systems. Neverdieless, it is important to determine whedier die central predictions of die economic approach do indeed have die support of evidence drawn from die real world.
The Empirical Analysis of Crime
Most empirical work based on die economic dieory of crime consists of crosssection regression analyses which seek to find statistical correlations between crime rates and putative determinants of crime covering many categories of crime, re gional areas and estimation techniques. Here, we are especially interested in die quantitative effects of different factors in die criminal justice system on die inci dence of crime. This mediodology seeks to establish die effects of die probability of punishment, die severity of punishment, and odier socioeconomic variables as sociated widi die perceived incidence of crime on die actual crime rate.
The vast majority of studies in die area1 have focused on die United States. But useful work has also been conducted in Australia, Britain, Canada, Finland, India and Sweden. In general, available econometric evidence provides strong sup port for die economic dieory of crime. Bodi die likelihood and die severity of punishment are stadstically significant deterrents of crime, however it is measured. Erling Eide (1994:156) has summarised die outcome of empirical research on die economic dieory of crime as f ollows:
As a whole, criminometric studies clearly indicate a negative association be tween crime and die probability and severity of punishment. The result may he regarded as a radier firm corroboradon of die deterrence explana tion in die dieory of radonal behaviour; an increase in die probability or se verity of punishment will decrease die expected udlity of criminal acts, and diereby die level of crime.
While die numerous empirical analyses of crime in tliis tradition have all employed different sets of data and embodied varying model specifications, diey also demon strate diat die deterrent effect of certainty of punishment is generally greater dian die deterrent effect of die severity of punishment. However, die deterrent effects of die probability and die severity of punishment differ significandy between different kinds of crime.
The statistical analysis of crime has at least two significant shortcomings. First, problems exist with the nature of the data on crime and punishment.2 For in stance, most crimes are under-reported, and the extent of under-reporting is likely to vary considerably from one jurisdiction to die next, and, widiin a given jurisdic tion, from one period and crime category to die next. Similarly, problems exist widi police crime statistics and dieir relationship to court stadsdcs on convicdons and prison stadsdcs on sentences actually served. Many invesdgators simply rely on ag gregate data and hope die biases will not be significant enough to obscure die true underlying relationships. Second, bias arises from die simultaneous equations used in regression analyses of die data. For example, if crime in some community in creases, dien diat community is likely to support harsher penalties as a means of coping widi die heightened crime problem. In a statistical analysis, diis could translate into a positive correlation between die level of crime and die severity of punishment, which distorts die apparent deterrent impact of punishment in die short run. Despite diese problems in die statistical analysis of crime, die weight of evidence overwhelmingly supports die view diat die crime rate is influenced by ex pected penalties.
Available evidence on odier possible determinants of crime is much less con clusive. Various proxies, like median family income, median income, labour in come to manufacturing workers, mean family income, mean income per tax unit and mean income per capita, have been used to measure die benefits of legal activi ties. But no systematic relationship has been found between legal income oppor tunities and crime rates. Similarly, estimates of various measures of die economic gains to crime and dieir relationship to die level of criminal behaviour have gener ated ambiguous results. Moreover, die effects of income differentials widiin society on crime rates are statistically inconsequential.
Unemployment deserves special mention. Ordiodox opinion in Australia and some European countries holds diat unemployment is a significant 'cause' of crime since, in die absence of 'socially adequate' welfare payments, crime is an attractive alternative to a life of poverty. Indeed, interest groups often argue diat one of die benefits of die increasingly expensive welfare state is diat it limits die growdi of criminal activity. Neverdieless, die available evidence shows litde systematic rela tionship between unemployment and crime rates.
Various sociodemographic variables have also been tested, most often age, population density and race. Several studies have found youdi to be a statistically significant determinant of crime. Similarly, a preponderance of research indicates diat population density is positively correlated widi criminal activity, aldiough diere may be reason to believe population density may reflect underlying influences, such as differences in die degree of social control. Race is also statistically significant, at least in die American national context: numerous studies find diat die proportion of 11011-whites in a given population is statistically associated widi high crime rates.
Concluding Remarks
The recent emphasis on law and order issues in State election campaigns shows that politicians from across the political spectrum believe that voters are concerned about crime. The question of whether or not actual crime rates have indeed risen is largely beside the point. To be sure, controversy exists as to whether various meas ures of criminal activity, including victim surveys, reflect any increase in crime. But even if crime rates are not rising, growing public alarm surely shows that people are becoming less inclined to accept existing crime levels: an entirely legitimate popular sentiment to which politicians have legitimately responded.
The economic theory of crime assumes that potential criminals are essentially rational individuals who weigh up the expected benefits and costs ol crime before engaging in criminal activity. There is strong evidence showing that raising the ex pected costs attached to criminal behaviour will reduce the incidence of crime, other tilings remaining constant. The economic approach to crime thus provides a rational basis for the development and implementation of criminal justice policies.
